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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the iterative process of grouping
and performance assessment that has led to the current
grouping of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent
nuclear fuel (SNF). The unique sensitivity analyses that
form the basis for incorporating DOE fuel into the total
system performance assessment (TSPA) base case model
are described. In addition, the chemistry that results from
dissolution of DOE fuel and high level waste (HLW)
glass in a failed co-disposal package, and the effects of
disposal of selected DOE SNF in high integrity cans are
presented.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The potential Monitored Geologic Repository at
Yucca Mountain contains 70,000 metric tons heavy metal
(MTHM) of high-level radioactive wastes composed of
7,000 MTHM of defense waste and 63,000 MTHM of
commercial SNF. The defense waste consists of 2,333
MTHM of DOE SNF and 4,667 MTHM of HLW. The
DOE SNF is composed of more than 250 different fuel
types with a wide range of characteristics such as fuel
matrix, fuel configuration, fissile content, burnup,
cladding, and fuel and cladding integrity. In the mid-
1990s the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program began an
iterative process of assessment and re-evaluation that has
progressed to the performance assessment calculations
that will be conducted to incorporate the DOE SNF into
the Site Recommendation (SR) and License Application
(LA). These analyses are unique due to the unique
character of the fuels themselves, the unique co-disposal
approach for DOE SNF and HLW, and the use of
surrogate fuels to represent the DOE spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) in the TSPA base case model.
II. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL GROUPS
The factors used to group the different types of DOE
SNF have different levels of importance depending on the
specific analysis that will be preformed based on the
grouping results. The factors used in grouping are fuel
matrix, fuel cladding, fuel condition, fissile species
enrichment, and burnup. Each factor has a different level
of importance depending on whether the grouping is
being performed for design basis accident analysis,
criticality analysis, or performance assessment. For
example, fissile content and species is more important to
grouping for criticality than it is to grouping for
performance assessment. Application of the factors
important to performance assessment yields the grouping
that is used for the assessment.
The iterative process of grouping followed by
performance assessment has led to 11 groups1 of DOE
SNF as follows where the number in parenthesis is the
total amount of SNF in each group in MTHM:
1.   Classified Navy (65)
2.   Plutonium/Uranium alloy (9.1)
3.   Plutonium/Uranium carbide (0.1)
4.   Plutonium/Uranium & Plutonium oxide (12.4)
5.   Thorium/Uranium carbide (26.3)
6.   Thorium/Uranium oxide (50.4)
7.   Uranium metal (2,127.2)
8.   Uranium oxide (178.2)
9.   Aluminum based (20.9)
10. Unknown (4.5)
11. Uranium-Zirconium hydride (1.6).
This grouping is somewhat different than the grouping
used for the total system performance assessment for the
viability assessment (TSPA-VA) that contained 16 SNF
groups.2, 3 It is also somewhat different than that of an
earlier set of analyses conducted prior to TSPA-VA that
analyzed 13 groups of SNF.4 The groupings have been
simplified through the iterative process of grouping and
performance assessment. The results of the performance
assessment have been used to simplify the next grouping.
The iterative process has shown that the only grouping
parameter important to performance is fuel matrix.
However, burnup is used to obtain the radionuclide
inventory for each SNF group. Even though the overall
groupings have been simplified the major results of each
successive performance assessment are unchanged.4, 3, & 5
In the past, the total amount (2,495.7 MTHM) of
SNF has been reduced (with the exception of Navy fuel)
to the 2,333 MTHM incorporated into the base case TSPA
model. However, sensitivity analyses have been
conducted for the full amount of DOE SNF and the HLW
necessary to co-dispose that amount of SNF. 4, 3, & 5 The
grouping shown above was used for the latest sensitivity
analyses of DOE SNF,5 and will be used for the analyses
supporting the Site Recommendation (SR).
III. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Performance assessment is conducted using a
simplified model that incorporates all of the processes and
events important to safety. This model incorporates the
potential wastes disposed at the repository, the repository
design, the waste package design, the geologic and
hydrologic systems, and the biosphere. The Repository
Integration Program (RIP) model captures uncertainty of
the processes and events through statistical distributions
of model parameters. Analyses are conducted using the
probabilistic model to analyze doses from numerous sets
of natural and engineered system conditions that in total
represent the potential behavior of the overall system. The
complex nature of the model limits the number of waste
forms explicitly incorporated into it due to restricted
computer storage and model running time. For these
reasons the DOE SNF is incorporated into the base case
TSPA model as a surrogate that is representative of the
DOE SNF groups.
The base case TSPA model was used to conduct
sensitivity analyses of the individual groups of DOE SNF
to show that the surrogate used is a reasonable
representation. Sensitivity analyses were conducted for
each group, one at a time, in the environment of the base
case model by calculating the expected value dose history
attributed to that group. The dose history for all DOE
groups was then summed and compared to the dose
history for the surrogate used in the base case model.
Sensitivity analyses of physical properties, dissolution
models, and dissolution rates are used to demonstrate that
the dissolution model used for the surrogate is
conservative as compared to more realistic
representations. For TSPA-VA the DOE SNF, including
Navy fuel, was incorporated in the base case model as a
single uranium metal surrogate, and the uranium metal
dissolution model was used for the surrogate fuel.3 The
sensitivity analyses used dissolution models for specific
groups (carbide, oxide, ceramic, or uranium metal).3 The
dose from each group was summed and the composite of
all groups was compared to the dose from the surrogate
used in the base case model to indicate that the surrogate
was representative of the DOE fuels. The composite of
the individual groups was also compared to an equivalent
amount of unclad commercial SNF.3  In the 1999 analyses
of DOE SNF the grouping above was used to investigate
disposal of small amounts of degraded SNF in a high
integrity can (HIC); the effects of including radionuclides
in addition to the nine analyzed in TSPA-VA; and the
geochemical effects of HLW and SNF dissolving in a
failed co-disposal waste package.
The fissile content of much of the DOE fuel will
necessitate co-disposal with five canisters of HLW glass
surrounding one canister of SNF. Co-disposal is unique to
DOE fuel, and the dissolution of fuel and glass combined
with corrosion of metal package components can change
the radionuclide release rate from the failed package. In
the 1999 performance assessment, the geochemical model
EQ3/6 was used to analyze the effects of co-disposal on
release of radionuclides from the failed package.5
IV. RESULTS
The expected-value dose history of an individual
20 km down the hydraulic gradient from the repository is
illustrated in Figure 1 for the TSPA-VA base case model.
The initial dose, from first occurrence to approximate
40,000 yr is from a combination of 99Tc and 129I, and after
50,000 yr the dose is primarily from 237Np (Figure 1).
Figure 2 depicts a comparison of the expected value
total dose histories at 20 km over 100,000 yr from 2,333
MTHM of each of the following: the surrogate uranium
metal fuel used in the base case model; the total dose
from the composite of the individual SNF groups; and
unclad commercial SNF.3 These results suggest that the
uranium metal surrogate is a good representation of the
DOE fuel in the base case model, and that unclad
commercial SNF could be used as an upper bound for the
DOE SNF. The ragged nature of the composite dose curve
is due to the method of development. Spikes in dose,
caused by rapid release of 99Tc and 129I, at failure of
individual packages are additive for groups having similar
numbers and twice the number of packages. The package
Figure 1.  Expected-value dose history at 20 km over 100,000 yr from TSPA-VA base case.
Figure 2.  Expected-value dose history at 20 km over 100,000 yr from 2,333 MTHM of DOE SNF, from 2,333 MTHM
of the Surrogate DOE SNF used in the Base Case, and from 2,333 MTHM of Commercial SNF.
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failures, at approximately the same time, produces spikes
in the composite curve that may be unrealistically high.
The results of TSPA-VA3 also indicated that the dose
from Navy fuel was about two orders of magnitude below
that from an equivalent dose (65 MTHM) of unclad
commercial SNF. Due to the robust nature of the Navy
fuel, its dose contribution may be very conservatively
bounded by the unclad uranium metal surrogate or unclad
commercial SNF.
Analyses of radionuclides in addition to those
included in TSPA-VA were conducted by calculating the
dose at the water table below the repository. This
calculation was done because there are no breakthrough
curves in the model for transport of the added
radionuclides through the saturated zone. Where
breakthrough curves exist for radionuclides, comparison
of dose at the water table and dose 20 km from the
repository shows that transport through the saturated zone
reduces dose by approximately a factor of ten. Analyses
of thorium/uranium carbide SNF (Group 5, where Ft. St.
Vrain fuel is typical) indicates that 229Th and 233U
contribute significantly to the total dose (at the water
table) after about 250,000 yr. In addition, after 250,000 yr
these radionuclides produce a larger contribution to total
dose than that from 237Np. Based on these results the
actinides in the 229Th chain are being incorporated into the
TSPA-SR base case model.
Sensitivity analyses of dissolution rate show that
there is no difference in dose history when the uranium
metal dissolution model is used or instantaneous
dissolution is assumed. This lack of difference exists
because the 99Tc and 129I in the waste package are released
in less than one model time step for both cases, and the
release of 237Np is controlled by solubility irrespective of
how much is available for transport. This result would
also be obtained for the oxide dissolution model for
commercial SNF as long as no cladding is assumed. The
assumption of cladding would moderate the release by the
cladding failure rate. Due to the amount of disrupted
cladding on most of the DOE SNF, no credit is taken for
cladding for the surrogate SNF. Sensitivity analyses of
percent of cladding present for DOE SNF indicate that
this is a conservative assumption. For example, 50 percent
cladding present on Group 7 (N Reactor) SNF would
reduce the height of the spikes caused by 99Tc and 129I by
a factor of two, but does not change the dose from 237Np
because there is more available for transport than can be
transported at its solubility limit.
Regarding the analyses of the HIC, an Alloy 22 can
with a wall thickness of 0.25 in.5was assumed. Figure 3
depicts the results of disposal of one HIC per co-disposal
package compared with not using the HIC. This figure
also depicts the dose from the TSPA-VA base case model
for the entire repository. The added corrosion resistant
barrier when the HIC is used delays the peak dose by
about 60,000 yr (Figure 3). The later dose peak has the
same dose rate as the earlier peak due to the long half-life
of 237Np (2.14 x 106 yr). When the HIC is not used the
fuel is assumed to be disposed in a stainless-steel canister
that provides no time delay of release after the waste
package has failed (i.e., the failure of the canister would
occur in less than one model time step).
Analyses of the geochemical environment in a failed
co-disposal package indicate that the geochemistry,
shortly after failure, is dominated by the corrosion of
A516 carbon steel (for about 300 yr for Fast Flux Test
Facility fuel) greatly reducing the pH (Figure 4).5 The
corrosion of the steel components of the waste package is
tempered by the alkalinity resulting from the dissolution
of the HLW glass. These two effects cause the
geochemistry within the failed package to be very
sensitive to the assumed corrosion and dissolution rates.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Results of analyses of DOE SNF using the TSPA-VA
base case model and the geochemical model EQ3/6 are as
follows:
• Grouping of DOE SNF for performance assessment
depends only on fuel matrix. However, fuel burnup is
used to obtain the radionuclide inventories needed for
the performance assessment model.
• Sensitivity analyses of DOE SNF demonstrate that
Groups 2-11 can be represented by an unclad
uranium metal surrogate in the TSPA base case
model, and that unclad commercial SNF surrogate
would bound the behavior of these groups. Due to the
robust nature of Navy fuel, clad commercial SNF
may be more a appropriate surrogate for Group 1
SNF and it will be used in the TSPA-SR base case
model.6
• Sensitivity analyses indicate that there is no
difference in dose when assuming instantaneous fuel
dissolution or the uranium metal dissolution model.
Figure 3.  Comparison of the TSPA-VA base case over 1,000,000 yr with the dose using the high integrity can and the dose
not using the high integrity can.
Figure 4.  Radionuclide aqueous concentrations, waste package materials remaining, and pH versus time from a waste
package breach for the Fast Flux Test Facility SNF (Group 4).
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• Examination of adding the actinides in the 229Th
chain to those radionuclides considered in TSPA-VA
shows that for Group 5 SNF 229Th and 233U are
significant contributors to dose after about 250,000
yr. As a result of this finding, actinides in this chain
will be added to the radionuclides considered for
TSPA-SR.
• Use of an Alloy 22 high integrity can for disposal of
SNF delays the dose peak by about 60,000 yr.
• Analyses of geochemistry in the failed co-disposal
waste package show that the corrosion of steel has a
significant influence on pH and radionuclide release.
This corrosion effect is moderated by the alkalinity of
the HLW glass.
Results using the TSPA-SR base case model are
expected to be similar to those of earlier TSPA models.
However, the dose peaks will be moved farther out in
time due to the addition of a drip shield that increases the
waste package lifetime.7 The conclusions drawn using the
TSPA-SR base case model are not expected to change as
the dose curves would have the same relationship with
each other though dose peaks occur at later times.
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